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R.

BLAKE BROWNt

INTRODUCTION
To the ability and devotion of the profession in past generations must
largely be attributed the heritage we have today. But the tendency,
which unfortunately is becoming so prevalent, to deny to the
individual his traditional right of access to the Comis, threatens to
undermine the achievements of centuries. In utter disregard of
consequences, the functions of Courts are being transferred to
government departments and boards. Thus the sacred rights of
individuals are often entrusted to the whims of officials whose main
qualification is political loyalty and who have no knowledge or
appreciation of those precedents which have stood the test of time.'

So asserted H.G. Sparling, a prominent Saskatchewan lawyer, in
193 7. His view was representative of the fears of many Canadian legal
professionals about the administrative state during the l 930s. 2
Concerned about the erosion of traditional legal principles, and applying
comparisons to the emerging fascist states of Europe, many Canadian
lawyers and judges launched vitriolic attacks on the growth of
government regulation and c01Tesponding use of administrative bodies
to implement new social and economic policies.
This view, however, did not go unopposed during the Depression
decade. Several prominent legal academics in Canada, notably W.P.M.
Kennedy, E. Russell Hopkins, J.A. Corry, John P. Humphrey, John
Willis, and Jacob Finkelman, argued that the modem Canadian state
required the use of government tribunals and boards as a method of
implementing policy. As we shall see, the arguments of these authors
reflected an important shift in how Canadian legal professionals thought
t I would like to thank Professor R.C.B. Risk and John Saywell for their advice and
suppo1i, and Jennifer Llewellyn, and the editors of this journal for their helpful comments.
1
"Editorial: Views of the Profession" (1937) 2 Sask. Bar Rev. 23 at 28-29.
2
See, for example, Sir William Mulock, "Address on his ninetieth birthday, 1934" (1934)
12 Can. Bar Rev. 35; and J.W. de B. faffis, "Justice of the Courts" (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev.
509.
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about the law. This article will explore the shifting attitudes within the
Canadian legal academy about administrative law between 1930 and
1941. This article will also explore why this change in attitudes
occuffed, and whether these academics affected the broader Canadian
legal community's views about the modem administrative state. These
issues will be discussed in a five-part analysis. Section one outlines how
Canadian legal professionals considered administrative agencies before
19 30. Section two indicates the importance of the Depression to the reevaluation of administrative law. Section three identifies the major
Depression-era legal writers in Canada who discussed the emergence of
the regulatory state. In section four, this paper compares and contrasts
the major themes of these authors. Finally, section five assesses how the
contents of Canada's legal journals at the end of the 1930s indicates a
broadening acceptance of administrative law. It will be shown that these
academics critiqued traditional ways of thinking about the relationship
between citizen and state, and undermined the formalist view of the law,
but in the end were less successful in providing an intellectual
framework for the future development of Canadian administrative law.
In making these assertions, this paper builds upon research by
R.C.B. Risk, who has demonstrated the existence of a Canadian legal
realist movement during the late 1920s and, paricularly, in the 1930s. 3
However, Risk has thus far failed to provide an in depth exploration of
how these Canadian scholars attempted to reshape thinking about the
administrative state. As early as 1984, Risk briefly demonstrated in the
Dalhousie Law Joumal that during the 1930s an important shift
occurred in thinking about the administrative state, 4 but to date no
Canadian legal historian has adequately assessed these trends. This
paper will attempt to fill this void by surveying the Canadian writing on
administrative law found in Canada's legal publications during the
Depression era, and by placing this literature within the English and
American intellectual context.
3 For Risk's best developed descriptions of the Canadian legal realist movement, see
R.C.B. Risk, "The Many Minds ofW.P.M. Kennedy" (1998) 48 U.T.L.J. 353; R.C.B. Risk,
"The Scholars and the Constitution: P.O.G.G. and the Privy Council" (1996) 23 Man. L.J.
496; R.C.B. Risk, "Volume I of the Journal: A Tribute and Belated Review" (1987) 37
U.T.L.J. 193. Also see R.C.B. Risk, "John Willis: A Tribute" (1985) 9 Dal. L.J. 521.
"R.C.B. Risk, "Lawyers, Courts, and the Rise of the Regulatory State" (1984) 9 Dal. L.J.
31.
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II.

CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,

PRE-1930

It is difficult to separate the histories of Canadian administrative
and constitutional law during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In England, the supremacy of Parliament dictated that the
government could empower government departments with
administrative powers which, theoretically, were safe from judicial
intrusion. In Canada, however, the division of legislative
responsibilities between provincial and dominion governments
established by the British North America Acf (BNA Act) meant that
administrative agencies often faced challenges to their constitutional
validity.
The history of Canadian administrative law was therefore often tied
closely to that of the constitution, a history that has long been
contentious among Canadian political historians concerned with the
battles between the provincial and federal governments during the
nineteenth century. For example, the titanic struggle between Sir John
A. Macdonald and Ontario's Premier Mowat has been immortalized by
historians as just one chapter in the long story of Canadian federalism. 6
More recently, the intellectual battlefield on which the politicians met
has been documented. 7 Historians such as Blaine Baker argue that
Canadian lawyers and judges demonstrated a willingness to consider the
policy ramifications of their decisions well into the nineteenth century. 8
In comparison to the early twentieth century, the law-versus-policy and
private-versus-public distinctions were more fluid, and Canadian judges
more concerned with the social and economic effects of their decisions
than with the creation of a scientific, logical set of legal doctrines. The
result of these trends was a more deferential mode of judicial
interpretation that generally supported government regulatory
initiatives.

Co!lstitutio11 Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Viet., c.3.
See, for example, C. Atmstrong, The Politics czfFederalism: Ontario s Relations with the
Federal Gowmment, 1867-1942 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981 ).
7
Robert Vipond, Liberty a11d Comm1mity: Canadian Federalism and the Failure ef the
Constitution (Albany: State University of New York, 1991 ).
8
G. Blaine Baker, "The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the LateVictorian Empire" (1985) 3 Law & History Review 219.
5
6
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However, by the late nineteenth century Canadian legal
professionals were affected by the rise of legal formalism
an
international phenomenon that altered many areas of the law. Legal
formalism, a complicated concept, could be characterized by an
adherence to four principles. First, it was premised by a strong belief that
law was composed of 'scientific' legal rules that could be discovered by
a careful study and application of legal principles. Second, these legal
rules could best be discerned and applied by a close examination of
previously decided cases. Thus, judges applied an increasingly rigid
doctrine of stare decisis during formalism's rise to ensure that there was
little deviation from established principles. Third, legal documents such
as legislation and contracts were often thought to speak for themselves,
such that a judge could interpret the meaning of legal documents by
simply looking for the 'plain meaning' of the words. Extrinsic evidence,
such as legislative debates or proof of the parties' intentions, was
thought to be unnecessary. Fourth, it was assumed that judges could
impartially hear the case before them, having little concern with the
policy implications of their rulings. Decisions were to be made on the
basis of scientific legal doctrines, rather than unpredictable attempts to
adjudicate cases based on the equity of legal outcomes. 9 The high priest
of English legal formalism in the realm of constitutional and
administrative law was A.V. Dicey. His analysis emphasized individual
rights, and the role of courts as the upholder of these rights. 10
Legal formalists held administrative law to be obnoxious for
several reasons. Tribunals were free to disregard precedents, and
interpreted statutes by explicitly considering policy ramifications. They
reduced the primacy of courts, and the protection of individual rights
seemed less likely when administered by agencies employing
procedures different from those used in the courts. With the gradual
expansion of the administrative state in England in the late nineteenth
century, and its rapid increase during and after World War One,
formalists lashed out at the increasingly important government
9 The international literature on formalism is extensive. See, for example, Morton J.
Ho1witz, The Transj0r111atioll ()/American
1780-1860 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1977); and P.S. Atiyah, The Rise()/Freedom o/ Co11trac/ (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984).
10
See Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theo1y (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)
at 140-162.
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departments vested with authority to make administrative decisions.
Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice of England, provided a formalist
reaction to the growing bureaucratic state in his famous 1929 book The
New Despotism/1 an attack which received support from several
English academics, including C.K. Allen and Sir John Marriott. 12
Several American scholars mirrored these critiques. 13
Formalism also played an important role in shaping how Canadian
lawyers thought about the administrative state during the early twentieth
century. For most of the late nineteenth century, Canadian comis
applied a less formalist interpretation of the constitution that permitted
the existence of administrative bodies. However, by the end of the
nineteenth century formalism began to affect the interpretation of the
BNA Act such that the legislative spheres of the Dominion and the
provinces were judicially interpreted to be completely separate. 14 This
polarization of legislative responsibilities provided courts with the
opportunity to strike down administrative schemes that infringed the
legislative spheres of the dominion or provincial governments. Implicit
in this emerging jurisprudential trend were substantial concerns about
the increasing size of the administrative state. Bernard Hibbitts argues
that the Supreme Court's 1920 Board o.fCommerce15 decision marked a
watershed in the relationship between the Supreme Court and the
Canadian state. In the liberal-individualist state encouraged by
formalism the role of "the judiciary was limiting and restraining,''
Hibbitts suggests, and its duty "was to protect the individual, the
ultimate creative and responsible force in society, against the state. Law
11

Baron Gordon Hewart, The NeJtJ Despotism (London: Fe Benn, 1929).
For a discussion of this literature see Loughlin, sttpra note 10 at 162-165. Allen's major
contributions during this period included C.K. Allen, Law Ii1 the Malai1g (Oxford: Clarendon,
1927); and C.K. Allen, Bureaucracy Triz111tpha11t (London: Oxford University Press, 1931 ).
Marriott's work included J. Marriott, English Political fllstitutions, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1930); and J. Marriott, The Mechanisms ()fthe Modem State (Oxford: Clarendon,
1927).
13 For a discussion of American debates on the value of the administrative law, see Horwitz
(1992), s1tpra note 9 at 213-246.
14
R.C.B. Risk, "Canadian Courts Under the Influence" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 687 at 689. Also
see R.C.B. Risk, "A.H.F. LeFroy: Common Law Thought in Late Nineteenth-Century
Canada: On Burying One's Grandfather" 41 (1991) U.T.L.J. 307; and R.C.B. Risk,
"Constitutional Thought in the Late Nineteenth Century" ( 1991) 20 Man. L. J. 196.
15 Ri!fermce Re The Board of Commerce Act alld the Fair Prices Act of 1919 (1920), 60
S.C.R. 456.
12
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was the crucial boundary between the two, shielding the one from the
power of other and defining the parameters of their respective spheres." In
regards to administrative law, this movement required that administrative
"discretion was to be restrained in the name of the rule oflaw." 16

m. THE DEPREssmN AND THE crus1s IN
CANADIAN LEGAL ORTHODOXY

The 1930s were among the most turbulent years in Canada's
history. Unemployment rates skyrocketed, international trade and per
capita income plummeted, and western farmers struggled to keep their
land productiove. The economic crisis spurred the growth of new
political parties, such as the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation
and Social Credit Party. Early efforts to battle the Depression saw
governments restrict spending, although a movement for more liberal
spending policies slowly gained strength. Stories of jobless men 'riding
the rails' still permeate Canadians' collective memory, and rapid
declines in today's stock market quickly result in comparisons to the
Great Crash of 1929.
To their collective memory of the Depression, Canada's lawyers
add the famous constitutional cases of the 1930s. These cases are
typically remembered as the judiciary's rejection of a variety of
dominion, and to a lesser extent, provincial, programs aimed at
alleviating the effects of the Depression. Several cases decided by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in the early 1930s had
given hope to those advocating for greater dominion powers. 17 In
Proprieta1y Articles Trade Association v. A. G Canada, 18 the JCPC
upheld dominion legislation by employing an expansive reading of
Ottawa's criminal law jurisdiction. In two reference cases, Radk/9 and
Aeronautics, 20 the JCPC determined that the dominion government
16
Bernard J. Hibbitts, "A Bridle for Leviathan: The Supreme Court and the Board of
Commerce" (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 65 at 104. Also see Bernard J. Hibbitts, "A Change of
Mind: The Supreme Court and the Board of Railway Commissioners, 1903-1929" (1991) 41
U.T.L.J. 60.
17
Risk, "The Scholars," supra note 3 at 505-506.
18
Proprielmy Articles Trade Association v. A.G. Canada [1931] A.C. 668.
19
Re Regulation and Control o/Aeronautics [1931] A.C. 54.
20
Re Regulat1011 and Control q/Radio Comm1micat1011s [ 1932] A.C. 18.
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could implement national legislation in order to fulfill commitments
undertaken when the government in Ottawa signed international
treaties. However, this perceived trend toward increased dominion
powers ended in 1936 and 1937 when both the Supreme Court and JCPC
found most of Prime Minister R.B. Bennett's 'New Deal' legislation to
be ultra vires the dominion government. 21 The New Deal legislation
sought to implement regulatory and administrative schemes to combat
the Depression. The JCPC upheld a federal act to assist the ravaged
prairie agricultural industry, 22 but struck down legislation creating new
labour regulations, 23 establishing a system of unemployment
insurance, 24 devising an industry competition policy, 25 and creating a
method of marketing natural products. 26
As today's law students struggle to stay attentive to lectures about
these seemingly 'ancient' federalism decisions, the importance of them
is undoubtedly lost. These cases, and the debates they stimulated among
lawyers and academics, created a crisis in Canadian legal analysis no
less important to the development of Canadian law than was the creation
of the CCF to Canadian social and political life. The basic assumptions
of legal analysis were questioned in the face of new social realities. This
debate often focused on the administrative state, as Canadian lawyers
and academics sought to reshape the role oflaw in light of the expansion
of government regulatory initiatives. This struggle also occuned in the
United States and Britain. According to Morton Horwitz, for instance,
the American social context of the early twentieth century required that
constitutional law
confront the meaning of its long-standing commitment to the idea of
neutrality. Amidst increasing pressure to bring law into closer touch
21
A.G. Ca11ada v. A.G. 011tario [1937] A.C. 326; A.G. Ca11ada v. A.G. Ontario [1937]
A.C. 355; A.G. B. C v. A.G. Ca11ada [1937] A.C. 368; A.G. B.C v. A.G. Ca11ada [1937] A.C.
377; A.G. B.C v. A.G. Canada [1937] A.C. 391; and A.G. Ontario v. A.G. Canada [1937]
A.C. 405. For a discussion see W.H. McConnell, "The Judicial Review of Prime Minister
Bennett's 'New Deal"' (1968) 6 Osgoode Hall L.J. 39.
22
Fanners' Credito1:r Arrangement Act, 24-25 Geo. V, c.53.
23
This included the Limila!iol! o/Ho1trs ofWork Act, 25-26 Geo. V, 1935, c.63, the Weekly
Rest in /11d11strial in /11dustrial U11dertahi1gs Act, 25-26 Geo. V, 1935, c.14, and the Minim1tm
Wages Act, 25-26 Geo. V, 1935, c.44.
24
Unemployment Insurance: Tile Employment and Social Insurance Act, 25-26 Geo. V,
1935, c.38.
25
Domli1io11 Trade and /ndt1st1y Commission Act, 25-26 Geo. V, c.59.
26
Natural Prodt1c! Marketing Act, 24-25 Geo. V., 1934, c.57.
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with society, what could remain of the post-revolutionary ideal that of
a government of laws whose judges saw their role as impartially
discovering and declaring pre-existing law? What was to be the fate of
the still-broader nineteenth-century ideal of a neutral, non-distributive
state astride an American society becoming ever more unequal in
wealth and power? 27

In the United States these challenges led a number of scholars and
legal professionals, under the names 'sociological jurisprudence' and
then 'legal realism,' to question the assumptions of American
formalism. The literature on these movements is substantial, 28 but a
definition of American legal criticism remains difficult. 29 Nevertheless,
a general outline of key principles is possible. Beginning in the early
twentieth century a number of American academics, notably Roscoe
Pound, developed a theory of 'sociological jurisprudence' based upon a
belief that the law had lost step with society, and that judges should
consider the economic and social consequences of their decisions. 30 A
product of the American Progressive movement, advocates of
sociological jurisprudence considered social science methods in legal
analysis, and were optimistic about their ability to correct the law. In the
1920s and 1930s, this stream of thought was expanded by American
Legal Realists, a more cynical movement which refuted suggestions that
the law was based upon abstract, scientific principles, and that judges
were impartial. 31 A heated debate emerged in the early 1930s between
Pound and Legal Realism's most famous proponent, Karl Llewellyn, in
27

Horwitz (1992), stijlra note 9 at 5.
For recent discussions see N.E.H. Hull, Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn: Searching
.fer a11 American Jurisprudence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); John Henry
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (Chapel Hill, North
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); William W. Fisher III, Morton J.
Horwitz, and Thomas A. Reed, Ame1ican Legal Realism (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993); and Horwitz (1992), ibid.
29
Horwitz suggests that "Legal Realism was neither a coherent intellectual movement nor
a consistent or systematic jurisprudence. It expressed more an intellectual mood than a clear
body of tenets, more a set of sometimes contradictory tendencies than a rigorous set of
methodologies or propositions about legal theory." Horwitz (1992), ibid. at 169. N.E.H. Hull
meanwhile asks: "If the men who lived through the controversy could not define legal
realism's central tenets, what hope had the historians?" Hull, ibid. at 174.
3
°Kermit L. Hall, The Magic lvftiror: Law in American Hist01y (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989) at 224.
31
ibid. at 269.
32
Horwitz (1992), szijlra note 9 at 169-192.
28
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which Llewellyn attacked Pound's ideas, which, by the 1930s, Realists
deemed too conservative. Despite this controversy, the underlying
challenge to legal formalism offered by sociological jurisprudence and
legal realism, according to Horwitz, makes the similarities between the
movements greater than their differences. 32

THE CANADIAN LEGAL REALISTS AND
CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

In the late 1920s and particularly in the 1930s several Canadian
legal academics, like their American contemporaries, sought to
reconceptualize the relationship between the state and the citizen by
questioning commonly held assumptions about the law. 33 The small size
of the English-Canadian academic legal community during the 1930s
(approximately twenty full-time law professors in English Canada)
dictated that no one university became the center of legal realism in
Canada. 34 Rather, a number of law professors from across the country
played important parts in the movement. The most prominent
participants in the defence of administrative law were John Willis of
Dalhousie University; McGill's John P. Humphrey; Jacob Finkelman
and W.P.M. Kennedy at the University of Toronto; and J.A. Corry and
E.R. Hopkins of the University of Saskatchewan. 35 Often armed with

Risk, "The Many Minds," supra note 3 at 369-370.
Dalhousie, for example, the oldest common-law school in Canada, had four full-time
professors in 1930. John Willis, A Hist01y (}(Dal!tousie Law Sc/tool (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1979) at 103. Ontario had only two law programs prior to 1957. The
practitioners' school, Osgoode Hall, had four full-time lecturers for most of the 1930s; the
University of Toronto law program employed the same number of full-time professors in
1930. C. Ian Kyer and Jerome Bickenbach, T!te Fiercest Debate: CeC1! A. Wrig!tt, t!te
Bellc!ters, alld Legal Edt1catioll Iii Ontario, 1923-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1987) at 115.
35 Little Canadian writing on administrative law existed prior to these authors. Nigel
Tennant published perhaps the first major aiiicle in Canada on the subject in the 1928
Ca11adia11 Bar ReJJiew. Tennant considered the power of the courts to review the decisions of
administrative agencies in cases where the legislature had not expressly provided for such a
review. Tennant's arguments demonstrated his adherence to some formalist ideas. For
example, he suggested that, in the absence of express statutory provisions outlining the
33

34
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American legal ideas gained through graduate work at top American law
schools,36 this group of Canadian academics questioned the principles
of legal formalism concerning administrative law in the hope of
affecting positive change. 37
In John Willis, Dalhousie had one of the most zealous proponents
of the administrative state. Born in England, Willis studied at
Winchester, Oxford, and Harvard. He joined Dalhousie's law school in
1933 and remained there until 1944, at which time he moved to Toronto
to join the faculty of Osgoode Hall Law School. Willis worked for the
legal department of the International Monetary Fund in 1947-1948, and

procedure to be employed by administrative boards, tribunals should use the procedures
developed in the courts. Tennant, however, did recognize the value of these tribunals'
expertise:
Presumably, a Board which exercises its energies and abilities within a
narrow field would be more efficient in solving the problems referred to it
than would a Court. The purpose and policy of creating Administrative
Boards is, in paii at least, based upon such an expectation. Does it not
seem anomalous, therefore, to suggest that an appeal should be allowed
from an expert to a non-expe1i body?
Nigel B. Tennant, "Administrative Finality" (1928) 6 Can. Bar Rev. 497 at 513.
36
Willis studied at Harvard under the guidance of Felix Frankfurter. Risk, "John Willis,"
supra note 3 at 526. Corry completed a masters degree in law at Columbia in 1935. Finkelman
was likely exposed to American realists when he attended the University of Toronto School of
Law. According to Bora Laskin, it was Kennedy who introduced him "to the riches of
American legal scholarship, to Holmes and Brandeis and Cardozo, to Pound and Frankfurter,
to the American legal realists, to Morris Cohen and Jerome Frank, and to so many others."
Bora Laskin, "Cecil A. Wright: A Personal Memoir" (1983) 33 U.T.L.J. 148 at 150. Other
graduates of the Kennedy law school were likely similarly affected, including Finkelman who
began lecturing at the University of Toronto School of Law in 1930 and completed a LLB in
1933.
37
This paper will not analyze the work ofD.M. Gordon. Gordon was a Victoria lawyer who
published extensively on administrative law from the 1920s to the 1970s. Like many of the
authors explored in this paper, Gordon supported the expansion of the administrative state
during the 1930s, but he nevertheless remained a proponent of formalist doctrines. Kent Roach
has explored this seeming contradiction in Gordon, concluding that his work demonstrates
that the formalist tradition did not have to result in hostility toward the administrative state.
According to Roach, "Gordon conceded much freedom to administrative bodies because he
believed that their work did not involve the recognition of legal rights and that no principled
and consistent grounds justified judicial intervention." Thus, if "control could not be
categorized, it had to be abandoned." Kent Roach, "The Administrative Law Scholarship of
D.M. Gordon" (1989) 34 McGill L.J. 1at33, 35. For Gordon's major articles of the 1930s see,
for example, D.M. Gordon, "The Observance of Law as a Condition of Jurisdiction" (1931) 47
L.Q. Rev. 386; and D.M. Gordon, '"Administrative' Tribunals and the Comis" (1933) 49 L.Q.
Rev. 94.
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in 1949 he accompanied Wright and Laskin in resigning from Osgoode
Hall and joining the School of Law at the University of Toronto. 38
John Humphrey received his B.C.L. from McGill University in
1927. Called to the Quebec bar in 1929, Humphrey began lecturing in
Roman Law at McGill in 1936, and in 1946 became dean of the McGill
law faculty. Though he primarily focused on international law and
human rights issues for the majority of his academic career, Humphrey
took an interest in administrative law in the late 1930s and 1940s.
At the University of Toronto law program, W.P.M. Kennedy and
Jacob Finkelman defended the use of administrative tribunals. Trained
as a English historian, Kennedy's interests shifted during the 1920s
toward the study of Canadian constitutional law. Kennedy also played
an important role in the history of legal education in Ontario. The law
program at the University of Toronto was just a sub-department of the
Political Economy Department until Kennedy reshaped legal education
at the University. Named 'Professor of Law and Federal Institutions' in
1927, Kennedy soon led an increasingly distinct law program. The
University made law a separate department in the Faculty of Arts in
1930, and eleven years later created the 'School ofLaw.' 39
Born in Poltava, Russia, Jacob Finkelman emigrated to Canada at
the age of eight months when his parents settled in Hamilton, Ontario.
Finkelman graduated with a B.A. from the University of Toronto in
1926, and proceeded to Osgoode Hall, from which he graduated in 1930
with honours. The law school at the University of Toronto recognized
his talents, and immediately after his graduation from Osgoode he
joined the teaching staff at Kennedy's law school as a lecturer in
Industrial and Administrative law. In 1932, Finkelman inaugurated the
first course in Labour law taught in Canada. The following year, the
University of Toronto granted Finkelman LL.B and M.A. degrees, and
appointed him a professor. By the early 1940s Finkelman garnered
respect as one of Canada's leading labour law experts. He assisted in the
preparation of Ontario's first collective bargaining act, and took a oneyear leave of absence from the law school in 1943 to act as the first
Registrar of the Ontario Labour Court. In 1944, Finkelman returned to
teach at the School of Law, but also became Chairman of Ontario's
Labour Board.
38
39

See Risk, "John Willis," supra note 3.
Risk, "The Many Minds," supra note 3 at 353-354, 365, 370-371.
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Like the University of Toronto, Saskatchewan had a pair of
professors advocating the acceptance of administrative law: James
Alexander Corry, and E. Russell Hopkins. Corry graduated with a
Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of Saskatchewan in 1923,
received a B.C.L from Oxford in 1927, and a LL.M from Columbia
University in 1935. Corry taught law at the University of Saskatchewan
between 1927 and 1936 before moving to Queen's University, where he
taught in the political science department until the 1960s. Corry's
primary academic interests included statutory interpretation and
administrative law. 40 E. Russell Hopkins attended law school in
Saskatchewan in the early 1930s, and came under the influence of,
among others, Corry. After attending Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar,
Hopkins returned to the University of Saskatchewan to teach. Like
Corry, Hopkins' interests included administrative law and statutory
interpretation.
Collectively, these academics attempted to reshape the legal
profession's view of administrative law. While the authors were not
identical in their approaches, topics, or quality of work, they shared
several mutual assumptions about how the law should be
reconceptualized with regard to the regulatory state. This paper will
provide an analysis, in turn, of the work of John Willis, W .P .M.
Kennedy, J.A. Corry, Jacob Finkelman, E.R. Hopkins, and John
Humphrey.
Z: John Wtl/is and the 'Functional Approach '

An English legal historian reading this paper might be perplexed by
the inclusion of Willis in a discussion of Canadian writing on the
administrative state during the 1930s. After all, prior to Willis' 1933
appointment to Dalhousie, much of his writing focused on English legal
developments. However, Willis developed an interest in the study of
Canadian administrative law as the Depression decade unfolded. His
fellow Canadian legal realists were undoubtedly pleased by his shift in
emphasis, for Willis possessed considerable expertise in administrative

See J.A. Corry, 1l{J: Life a11d Work: A Happy Par!!lership (Kingston: Queen's University,
1981).
41
For a full discussion of all of Willis' scholarly work see Risk, "John Willis," supra note 3.
40
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law, and one of the keenest minds in the Canadian legal academic
community. 41
Willis' expertise in administrative law, powerful analysis, and
focus on English developments during the early 1930s were all on
display in his 1933 book The Parliamentary Powers of English
Government Departments. 42 Willis was one of several English legal
academics, including William Robson and Ivor Jennings, 43 to respond
to C.K. Allen and Lord Hewart's attacks on the administrative state.
Willis suggested that the Lord Chief Justice's had descended "from
Olympus to launch an attack upon the 'lawlessness' of the government
departments," but that it was "time to call a halt and look more closely
into a few of the extraordinmy powers criticized by Lord Hewart."44 He
further asserted that the development of administrative government
departments reflected the new social realities of a more complex society.
The majority of his book discussed the procedures Parliament could use
to implement the administrative state. Some of the key issues identified
by Willis formed the basis for his future work on Canadian
administrative law. For example, he criticized the formalist methods of
interpreting regulatory statutes. Willis explained that, "armed with a
dictionary,"
the Court impartially construes the words, and since the words have
little meaning apart from an environment in which they are used, the
Court, compulsorily ignorant of their true environment, must place
them against the background of the Common Law, and replace the
assumptions of 1931 by the assumptions of Lord Coke. 45

Willis thought the solution might be the creation of administrative
courts, for the expanded fonn of government "must be administered by

42 John Willis, The Porliame11101y Powe1'.r ol English G0Fen1me11! Deportments
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933).
43 For a discussion of these scholars see Loughlin, supra note 10 at 165-181. Robson's
major work in this period was Justice a11d Admi11islraliJJe Low: o Study o/ lhe British
Conslilulio11 (London: Macmillan, 1928). Jennings work tended to focus on both
administrative and constitutional law. See W.l. Jennings, The Law and the Co11stilu/io11
(London: University of London, 1933); W.I. Jennings, "The Report on Ministers' Powers"
(1932) 10 Public Admin. 333; and W.l. Jennings, "The Courts and Administrative Law The
Experience of English Housing Legislation" ( 1936) 49 Harvard L.R. 426.
44
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those who do not draw their inspiration from Common Law
analogies." 46
Willis' first direct foray into the Canadian discussion about
administrative law came in 1935. In his article, "Three Approaches to
Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the
Functional"47 published in the first issue of the University qf Toronto
Law Journal, Willis argued that it was a common and necessary feature
of English government to delegate powers to departments and
commissions. After establishing the necessity of such bodies, Willis
suggested that the practical problem was "how to fit into our
constitutional structure these new institutions whose growth seems
inevitable."48 Willis argued that the answer to this question depended on
which of three possible approaches one took toward government by
departments or commissions: the judicial approach, the conceptual
approach, or the functional approach.
Advocates of the judicial approach perceived statute law as an
intrusion upon the internal coherence on the common law, were
"uncompromisingly individualistic," such that rights "of prope1iy and
freedom from personal restraint are sacred," 49 and believed that
administrative law included an excessive application of executive
discretion. The result of these views was "an increase in the class of
discretions which the court is prepared to control," 50 the widening of
procedural errors for which courts would deprive tribunals of
jurisdiction, and courts' increased willingness to review administrative
decisions despite privative clauses. 51
Willis critiqued the creation of well-defined legal categories in his
discussion of the conceptual approach. In the conceptual approach,
judges formulated neat categories by relating the "unknown to the
known," and perceiving "the likeness in unlike things." 52 Willis
46
/bid at 172. For additional comments by Willis on English developments see John
Willis, "The Delegation of Legislative and Judicial Powers to Administrative Bodies" (19321933) 18 Iowa L.R. 150.
47
John Willis, "Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual,
and the Functional" (1935-1936) I U.T.L.J. 53.
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identified, as indicative of this type of reasoning, the distinction
commonly employed in England between 'judicial' and 'quasi-judicial'
functions. Formalists claimed that quasi-judicial decisions were based
on policy considerations, while judicial ones were not. Willis, however,
argued that decision-making bodies could not be so neatly defined into
such categories, and that the dichotomous division into judicial and
quasi-judicial broke down when applied to practical problems. Willis
asserted that all decisions involved policy choices, and thus "either all
decisions of appellate comis are 'quasi-judicial,' and so need not be
made by the ordinary courts at all, or else all decisions by administrative
bodies ... are judicial and so must be made by a judge and the court of
king's bench." 53 Although he undermined the conceptual differences
between tribunals and courts, Willis still believed that each body
possessed different sets of skills. He thus argued that decision-making
responsibilities should be assigned to the person or body best suited to
make specific types of determinations. For example, when policy was a
paramount factor, comis were inadequate decision-makers because
"although skilled in the ascertainment of facts and in weighing of
arguments," comis were "unskilled in the consistent determinations of
policy." 54
Willis preferred the functional approach to administrative law,
which required the establishment of commissions or 'governments in
miniature' to hear policy-oriented disputes. These commissions would
be appointed by the executive, but be free of departmental control and
possess memberships with security of tenure. These boards would often
include a lawyer, "for he is best equipped to investigate and estimate the
weight of facts upon which the decision of the board will be based," and
several others having "special knowledge of the problem which the
legislation is designed to solve, for policy can best be translated into
action by those who know the background against which it is placed. " 55
Willis recognized the problem of unlimited administrative
discretion, but believed that the regular courts were not well-suited to
considering appeals from tribunals. In three ways Willis criticized the
English and Canadian practise of pe1mitting appeals to the courts for
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errors oflaw. First, he suggested that allowing the courts to overturn the
decision of a specialized tribunal meant that "the amateur is asked to
upset the expert. " 56 Second, questions of law were difficult to
differentiate from questions of fact. Last, Willis argued that the best way
to secure a responsible commission "is to show some confidence in the
ability of the men selected to do their job faithfully and according to the
law."57 Having argued that courts were ill-suited to review commission
decisions, Willis advocated for the creation of a special administrative
review court, which, like the lower tribunal, possessed specialized
knowledge of the subject area within its jurisdiction.
In a 193 9 Harvard Law Review article, Willis again examined what
courts actually did, explaining how Canadian courts employed
techniques of interpretation to permit reviews of administrative
decisions. In so doing, Willis provided his most explicit statement of the
role of politics in shaping legal analysis. Willis argued that the increased
legislation since World War One had prompted the judiciary to strike
back. Big business interests began constitutional battles to prevent
legislative incursions into the /aissez-fitire market. Business received
favourable hearing from Canadian judges, and in many cases "the
political ideas behind the supposed constitutional prohibition against
'abdication' [delegation] are seen in their most naked form. " 58 In
addition, the bench feared encroachments on the powers of courts.
According to Willis, the trends in Canada could be explained by taking
into "account the all-powerful force of judicial legislation" and by
remembering "that behind that force lies the desire to protect against
'encroachments' on the traditional jurisdiction of the ordinary comis. " 59
These encroachments hindered the development of the modem
administrative state. Willis demonstrated how the judicial interpretation
of s.96 of the JJNA Act permitted the courts to interfere in administrative
agencies if they deemed these bodies to possess some similarities to
superior courts. He noted that a separation of powers doctrine had been
judicially interpreted into s.96, thus leading courts to ask whether the
tribunal was doing what was exclusively the purview of superior courts
56 lbtd.

at 79.

58 J. Willis, "Administrative Law and the British North America Act" (1939) 53 Harvard
L.R. 251 at 259.
59 Ibid. at 265.
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in 1867. 60 This question resulted in increased judicial control of the
administrative process, and this interference, said Willis, "has been to
retard the growth of the administrative system in Canada."61 Willis
attacked how courts accomplished this, arguing that if it is asked how
substantial restriction on the legislative power of the provinces has
been evolved from a constitutional provision reserving to the
Dominion the appointment of Superior Court judges, we can only
point to the judicial legislation outlined above and marvel at the way in
which deeply held political beliefs succeed in establishing themselves
in the most unlikely phrases of constitutions. 62

Willis continued to blame the courts in his discussion of the
judicial review of administrative action. Courts had created a "commonlaw Bill of Rights" by which judges side-stepped privative clauses by
asserting that legislatures did not intend to deprive citizens of their right
to access the courts. This could be used by the courts to control "an
expressed intent of which they happen to disapprove." 63 In addition,
courts controlled the procedures employed in the administrative process
by inferring judicial procedures to tribunals, and treating procedural
errors as excesses of jurisdiction through the employment of the
prerogative writs certiorari or mandamus. These judicial excesses
stemmed from the social legislation passed during the Depression:
The years of depression since 1929 have induced legislatures to pass
laws which are right out of line with traditional ways of thought and
therefore distasteful both to those guardians of the past, the lawyers,
and to their wealthy clients who have, of course, been adversely
affected by these laws. 64

Willis' transition in focus from English to Canadian legal
developments culminated with the publication, in 1941, of a collection
of essays on the Canadian administrative state, entitled Canadian
Boards at Work. 65 Willis brought together authors from a variety of
backgrounds, including T. N01man Dean, a statistician with the Ontario
6°For a fuller expansion of Willis' views on the judicial interpretation of s.96 see J. Willis,
"Section 96 of the British North America Act" (1940) 18 Can. Bar Rev. 517.
61
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Workmen's Compensation Board; George Farquhar, a member of the
Public Utilities Board of Nova Scotia; a former member of the Board of
Railway Commissioners for Canada, S.J. McLean; Ontario Securities
Commissioner, R.B. Whitehead, and professors J.A. Corry, E.F.
Whitmore, and Jacob Finkelman. 66 The articles by Corry and Finkelman
will be analysed later in this paper. Willis did not write an article, but
provided a lengthy foreword, and wrote three introductory essays for
sections of the book dealing with the work of administrative boards,
administrative discretion, and administrative procedure. As he had done
in his earlier work, Willis articulated his belief in a functional approach
to administrative law, concluding that the common law courts and
legislatures were "inadequate to perform the tasks required of a
government of the twentieth century." 67 He also demonstrated his
continued emphasis on the functional approach when he criticized
attempts to fit administrative agencies within the legislative, judicial,
and executive separation of powers, suggesting that "who, except a
lawyer or a political theorist, cares what any board conceptually 'is' as
long as he knows what it in fact does?" 68
ii WPM. Ke11nedy a11d the Study Administrative Law
W.P.M. Kennedy proudly reported in 1934 that the law program at
the University of Toronto was the only university in the British Empire
that provided special undergraduate and graduate courses in
administrative law. 69 Kennedy, as Risk has recently indicated, took an
interest in administrative law in the late 1920s, and his inclusion of
administrative law in the University of Toronto curriculum appeared to
mirror this concern. Kennedy expressed many of the formalist's fears
about the rise of the regulatory state until 1934, when he substantially
changed his views and became a proponent of the regulatory state. 70 He
argued for the necessity of legislative delegation in the changed societal
circumstances of the twentieth century. Industrial development, for
Other authors included D.W. Buchanan, a Traffic Manager of the Viceroy
Manufacturing Company in Toronto; and Saskatoon practitioner R.L. Winton. Ibid. at xv.
67
Ibid. at v.
68
Ibid. at 2.
69
W.P.M. Kennedy, "Aspects of Administrative Law in Canada" (1934) 46 Juridical
Review 203 at 223.
70
Risk, "The Many Minds," Stij?m note 3 at 376-377.
66

54-DALHOUSIEJOURNALOFLEGAL STUDIES

instance, required "not laissez-faire but government control," and
increased government intervention "predicates increased legislation,
and necessarily, under modern conditions, delegated legislation." 71
Kennedy made explicit his desire to make the law more attuned to the
needs of Canada in the Depression:
New standards must be developed in all fields of human endeavour
which will be in harmony with the new social philosophy of the age.
Care of the sick, the poor, the aged, and the infirm, elimination of
slums, control of industry in the interests of humanity, protection of
children, universal education, development of natural resources for the
benefit of mankind, all demand immediate attention. 72

Administrative agencies served as experimental laboratories in
achieving these goals. These experiments were acceptable so long as
they operated within the boundaries set up by the legislatures, and
conformed to the most important tenants of natural justice. This latter
stipulation required that no person judge his own cause, and that every
person have an adequate opportunity to present his case, but did not
include the application of technical rules of evidence, representation by
counsel, or hearings in an open court. 73
These requirements were indicative of Kennedy's continued
concerns about the safeguards necessary to prevent excessive
administrative discretion. Kennedy criticized Canadians for accepting
legislation delegating authority "even in cases where on the surface
there appears no vital necessity for such delegation,"74 and warned of
"the development of a vast administrative machine" that "leaves us open
to all the dangers of bureaucracy, the arch foe of democracy." 75 These
dangers led Kennedy to inquire into the controls exercised on tribunals
and boards. Unlike Willis and, as we shall see, Corry and Humphrey,
Kennedy argued against the creation of a system of administrative
courts to hear appeals from lower tribunals and agencies on the ground
that "a system of administrative courts composed of persons imbued
with the ideals of the civil service would strengthen the dangers. " 76
71
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Rather, administrative boards needed to establish standards, such as the
publication of reasons, which would permit courts to hear appeals fairly.
While Kennedy's academic writing focused predominantly on
Canadian constitutional law for the remainder of the 1930s, his interest
in administrative law remained apparent in two ways. First, he included
a chapter on administrative law in the second edition of his history of the
Canadian constitution, published in 1938. 77 The second indication of
Kennedy's continued interest in administrative law was the content of
the first volume of the University of Toronto Law Journal, the legal
publication established by Kennedy in 1935. 78 The first volume of the
UTLJ included articles by three of the authors who helped reshape the
Canadian legal profession's opinions about the value of administrative
law. We have already discussed the article by John Willis; the others
were by J.A. Corry and Jacob Finkelman.
iii JA. Corry and the Political Philosophy q/Admhzistrative Law
J.A. Corry has mostly been remembered as a political scientist at
Queen's, but Risk has recently stressed Corry's work as a legal
scholar. 79 Corry's work in administrative law during the 1930s
demonstrates his talents and interests in both scholarly fields.
Corry published his first major article on the administrative state in
1933. Published in the Proceedhzgs ofthe Canadian Political Science
Association, 8° Corry's article considered the changing social, economic,
and political conditions that resulted in the adoption of administrative
discretion as a device of governance. Corry asserted that parliament and
courts were ill-suited to implementing new government programs.
Courts, for example, employed procedures that assume "at every turn
77 W.P.M. Kennedy, The Co11slil11/io11 of Ca11ada, !534-1937: An fttlroduc/1011 lo its
Deve!opme11! Law m;d C11slom, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1938) at ch. XXVI.
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administrative law.
78
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that all men are equally able to defend their rights" 81 and that their
"whole emphasis is upon private right rather than social need." 82 In
making these assertions, Corry demonstrated his lack of faith in
nineteenth-century formalist principles. "The common law courts are
deprived of their control over the official," Corry argued
partly because of a lack of sympathy with social aims but mainly
because they are not suitable instruments for the furtherance of a
policy. For it has been their chief glory to have no policy other than to
hold the scales of justice evenly between interests which, in theory at
any rate, were capable of precise definition. 83

While Corry believed that administrative agencies helped alleviate such
problems, he also perceived the development of new issues, including
inadequate parliamentary supervision of boards and tribunals, and the
potential hmm done to individual rights by hasty administrative action.
In the end, he recognized that administrative bodies were "simply a
device of governance which, like all others, may be abused."
Furthermore,
whether it should be encouraged or resisted depends, not upon
whether it accommodates itself to the abstractions which satisfied the
temper and environment of an era of political development now
belonging to the past, but upon the nature of the result aimed at, the
efficacy of tried, traditional methods to achieve it and the character of
the interests which may be imperilled by its adoption in the particular
case. Only upon a balance of these considerations can a useful
judgment be rendered. 84

Corry published three more articles and a book on administrative
law by 1941, and these works remained primarily, though not
exclusively, focused on the political influences affecting administrative
boards. In 1936, he discussed the benefits and problems of publicly-run
industries and powerful regulatory boards in the Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science. 85 He also published an article in the
first volume of the UniFersity of Toronto Law Journal entitled
Ibid. at 192.
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"Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes." 86 Despite its
title, this article was concerned primarily with statutory interpretation, a
process he argued was a creative exercise. This led Corry to question
why courts failed to acknowledge their role in shaping the
administrative state. The common law tendency was for judges to
safeguard private rights from arbitrary action, but unfortunately judges
failed to "search out the objectives of state action or the means necessary
to achieve them. And any ambiguity in the rule will be resolved in
favour of individual rights rather than administrative efficiency." 87 This
often stultified parliament's aims, Corry argued, and thus "[w]e must
look much more closely at what the judges do than at what they say." 88
The inherently legislative role of judges affected administrative law.
"The modem state everywhere is engaged in adjusting itself to the
machine age," Corry explained, and legislators establish boards and
tribunals to meet new socio-economic challenges, but "at present the
judges interpret and apply these statutes and thus can further or obstruct
their objects. Unless they are familiar with the aim and purpose of the
legislation so as to aid in the adjustment, the orderly process will fail or
pass to other hands."89
Corry's next major project on administrative law was a 1939 study
prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial
Relations. 90 Ten chapters of this project examined the historical
expansion of regulation in such areas as public health, railways, and
labour relations. These descriptive chapters focused on the structure of
regulatory initiatives, and on the particular societal forces which
resulted in individual legislative schemes. The report is noteworthy here
for two reasons. First, Corry explained the reasons for the creation of ad
hoc administrative tribunals exercising judicial and legislative
functions. As he had done in previous articles, he focused on the shift in
political philosophy. During the nineteenth century the doctrine of
laissezfaire "received powerful confirmation in the everyday scene,"
Corry asserted, and thus the
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self-made men who have moulded Canada saw convincing proof of
the maxim in their own success. This belief in a self-reliant
individualism was strong enough to postpone any serious attempt at
state regulation until the twentieth century and to prevent any
significant development of social services other than education, until
after the Great War. 91

After the First World War, however, a change in assumptions about the
state/citizen relationship required a new form of governance. The report
is also noteworthy because Corry addressed whether a system of
administrative courts was preferable for controlling administrative
discretion. Corry argued that if courts reviewed the discretionary
decisions of administrative bodies then it was necessary that they be
experts in the area under consideration, and that they be well-infonned
of the legislation's purpose. Common law courts were poorly equipped
for these functions, and were hindered by their inherently conservative
nature. However, the palpable danger of unlimited discretion led Corry
to argue, like Willis, for the establishment of permanent administrative
courts which would apply a uniform set of procedures when dealing
with disputes between individuals and state officials. 92
Corry also wrote the introduction to Willis' 1941 book Canadian
Boards at Work. Here Corry outlined some of the major types of boards,
and, more importantly, continued to drive home his explanation of the
shift in philosophical assumptions which underlay the need for
administrative agencies. 93 "The role which govermnent is expected to
play in any society largely determines the means which are to be
employed," suggested Corry, and thus in "any discussion of the part
played by boards and commissions in present-day government, this
close relationship between methods and objectives must be kept
constantly in mind." 94 Laissez-:flui'e presumptions had dictated that the
state should have little involvement in the day to day life of citizens, but
with industrialization and urbanization laissezfaire was rejected
"because it was found to be inadequate in a complex society. It is to be
replaced by a collectivist ideal which aims at the welfare of the group,
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albeit at considerable cost to the claim of the individual to do as he
pleases." 95

iv. Jacob Finkelman and the Separation efPowers
Jacob Finkelman's first foray into the debate about administrative
law also came in the first issue of the University ef Toronto Law
Journal. In "Separation of Powers: A Study in Administrative Law," 96
Finkelman explored the validity of the tripartite division of government
into 'legislative,' 'executive,' and 'judicial' parts. Finkelman related the
attacks of Lord Hewart and C.K. Allen, and asserted that these critiques
were part of a larger movement in which criticisms
from the courts became more pronounced as parliament, apparently
convinced that the traditional conservatism of the judiciary was illsuited for the application of new social standards, and itself groaning
under the weight of unparalleled burdens, boldly took the bit between
its teeth, and began to withdraw more and more jurisdiction from the
courts. 97

Finkelman drew upon Willis' "Three Approaches to Administrative
Law" article in asking whether the concepts of legislative, executive,
and judicial had precise meanings. He quickly dismissed the accuracy of
the terms, suggesting that "it has never been found possible to
differentiate absolutely the functions of govemment."98 The remainder
of his paper focused on issues relating to judicial review of
administrative decisions, and the judicial construction of constitutional
instruments.
Finkelman argued throughout his paper that doctrine did not
determine the outcome of cases. For example, he pointed out that the
distinctions between 'ministerial' and 'judicial' employed in mandamus
often broke down such that they "do not represent anything of
definiteness." 99 Similarly, the separation of powers distinction "has no
place as a principle of law." 100 Rather, practical concerns should
95
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develop an effective working system. The allocation of powers "need
not imply either theoretical or actual separation, but leaves ample room
for interaction," and thus the allocation of government functions "grows
out of necessity and common sense." 101 Finkelman concluded with a
plea that practical concerns dominate the consideration of
administrative law. Interestingly, Finkelman saw the freedom of courts
to intervene in the administrative process as imperative to this aim. "It is
better for law, in serving the ends of society," contemplated Finkelman,
to allow as much freedom as possible to the judiciary in controlling
'administrative' action, to take the risk of confused judgments, of
'distinguishings', of' distinctions', rather than to cabin and confine the
discretion of the judges. We are here dealing with a field of law which
by its very nature defies standardization or the alleged symmetry of
codification. The time is not yet ripe for the laying down of any
complete scheme of the relationship between the judiciary and
administrative law; and we can only hope that, ifthat time ever comes,
there will prevail such a sanity, derived from experience and goodwill,
as will result in preserving a due balance between working efficiency
and the life of the individual citizen. 102

In Finkelman's second major piece on administrative law,
published in 1939, he provided a powerful argument as to why modem
states required administrative bodies. 103 Finkelman asked his readers to
consider how changes in the social philosophy of government
necessitated the creation of new institutions. "The situation may be
summed up in a few words," Finkelman argued: society "is abandoning
one philosophy and is adopting another. Laissezfaire is rapidly fading
into the limbo of forgotten things and in its place we are developing new
doctrines .... " 104 Finkelman then returned to a discussion of the
separation of powers, arguing that the nineteenth-century focus on
liberty led to the division between judicial, executive, and legislative
branches. These were aiiificial, theoretical distinctions, and Finkelman
asked his readers to "tum from theory to practise," and "tum from
diatribes to realities; let us examine facts." 105 The legal system had
milTored the dominant philosophy of individualism, but then
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came the rude awakening. The romance was ended. Laissez-fit/re had
failed to bring happiness to the masses of mankind. In fact, the untold
misery and suffering and the social waste which followed in the wake
of the new industrial system caused a revulsion of feeling which is
gradually undermining even the positive achievements of the past
century. 106

Governments needed to balance collective and individual needs, and
people turned to the state for assistance.
Finkelman, however, had concerns about the new administrative
state. People demanded from their politicians a more activist
government, but Finkelman asse1ied that politicians had "passed the
buck" to new administrative agencies. 107 He recognized the positive
attributes of these administrative agencies - including their speed,
technical skill, accessibility, freedom from technicality, and experience
- but expressed concern about the explosion of boards and tribunals.
Noting that Parliament should not abdicate its powers, he warned that
there were "many grave dangers inherent in such delegation, and the
critics of the system are quite right in calling attention to these
dangers." 108 Finkelman therefore advocated the creation of safeguards
similar to those which made Parliament the protector of British liberties
that is, that the public, through the democratic process, be active in
shaping the design and policies implemented by tribunals. In addition,
Finkelman encouraged the employment of three essential principles of
justice: that no person judge his or her own case, that no pa1iy be
condemned unheard, and that parties know the reasons for decisions. 109
Finkelman also contributed to Willis' book on Canadian boards. 110
After indicating the extensive expansion of delegated authority, and the
concurrent increase in the powers delegated, Finkelman allayed fears
that the Ontario legislature had lost control over administrative bodies.
The cabinet governed administrative law through the issuance of
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regulations, suggested Finkelman, though he warned that care should be
taken in the formulation of regulations because they "cannot be subject
to the scrutiny of parliamentary debate," and thus "it would not be too
much to expect that the administrative authority which enacts them
should be most meticulous in its efforts to ensure that no injustice will be
caused through their operation." 111 In the end, however, delegated
legislation would only be controlled by the expression of public opinion
and its subsequent effect on the legislature. 112

v. E Russell Hopkins, John P Humphrey and Fears o/Discretion
Two new figures published on Canadian administrative law in
1939: E. Russell Hopkins and John Humphrey. Both scholars gave
considerable attention to alleviating the fears among the Canadian legal
community about the administrative state, although they used somewhat
different methods to accomplish this goal.
In his paper "Administrative Justice in Canada," Hopkins
explained at length the need for a new method of government which
would include extensive use of administrative tribunals. 113 He asserted
that administrative law was "no longer an illegitimate exotic," 114 but
admitted that boards and tribunals employed diverse procedures. These
procedures were excused on the ground that they were "experimental
laboratories whose activity is accompanied by the confusion and
irregularity associated with the process of trial and error." 115
In arguing for the administrative state, Hopkins employed three
broad arguments. First, like earlier Canadian legal realists, he attempted
to demonstrate the artificiality of the distinction between judicial and
administrative decision-making. The division between administrative
discretion and legal rule "stands firm in the heaven of ideas," but sways
"uneasily in the earthier air of application," 116 suggested Hopkins.
/bid. at 188.
Ibid.
113
E.R. Hopkins, "Administrative Justice in Canada" (1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 619.
Hopkins presented his ideas earlier in an address to the Canadian Bar Association's annual
meeting. E.R. Hopkins, "Administrative Justice in Canada" in Mtizutes qfProceedlizgs ofthe
Twenty-Fourth Annual 1kfeeting qfthe Canadian Bar Association (Ottawa: National Printers,
1940) 142.
114
Hopkins (1939), ibid. at 619.
115
Ibid. at 621.
116
Ibid. at 622.
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Discretion was inherent in administrative andjudicial decision making,
a view that was implicit in Hopkins' view of the judicial process:
It is fully recognized by the bar that legal opinions are as their name

implies in the nature of reasoned prophesies; that facts like witnesses
are not always reliable; that whenever recorded authority is silent,
obscure or confused, the judge is driven towards measures of
innovation; and that, moreover, with broad changes in the facts and
standards of society must come a gradual alchemy in the adjustment of
wise laws to modern instances. 117

In his second argument for the regulatory state, Hopkins focused on
the differences, rather than the similarities, between the administrative
and judicial decision-making processes. Judges applied existing legal
rules to the extent that changing social conditions permitted, but the
decision-making process in administrative law "contemplates the
settling of affairs by the discretionary pursuit of generalized statutory
objectives." 118 Thus, while both judges and administrators made
choices, boards and tribunals had more flexibility. This was necessary
because governance in England and Canada required increased state
action to decrease the hardships of the individualist state and laissez.faire economics. Thus, "the teteology oflaw is undergoing alteration; it
is no longer expressible simply in terms of the abstract freedom of the
abstract man. Freedom, it is true, is still an aim of government; but it is
freedom with security." 119
Hopkins' third argument focused on the benefits of the regulatory
state and promised increased certainty in the application of
administrative law in the years ahead. While admitting that occasional
errors would occur, he advocated experimentation. Citing Willis,
Hopkins called for a functional approach, pointing out the time and cost
savings of administrative law, and that board members possessed
specialized knowledge of the questions under dispute. Hopkins also
employed an argument in favour of administrative agencies aimed
directly at the pocketbooks of his fellow legal professionals. "It may be
added that of this legal order those learned in the law must remain
principal trustees," Hopkins pointed out, and between "the individual
and the state today there stands a maze of law and policy through which
117

/bid. at 623.
/bid. at 624.
119
/bid. at 626.
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the trained lawyer... is the most likely guide." 120 To further allay fears of
the administrative process, Hopkins pointed out that incorporating more
lawyers would introduce order and regularity, and "sponsor the growth
of an adequate theory of social control which without seriously
impairing the efficiency of these bodies would have due regard to the
event of individual justice." 121 He also hoped for increased certainty in
this new area of the law, believing that the discretion of boards and
tribunals would "resolve itself into rule and standard and administrative
law will increasingly approximate justice according to law." 122
Humphrey also demonstrated a desire to organize and
conceptualize administrative law. Humphrey began his 1939 article in
the Canadian Journal and Economics and Political Science by quickly
recounting the story of changed political and social circumstances
requiring the expansion of the regulatory state. 123 His primary concern,
however, was to identify the legal controls on illegal or arbitrary
administrative action. After asserting that courts provided the only
safeguards, he discussed various remedies including injunctions,
mandamus, habeas co1pus, quo warranto, prohibition, and certiorari.
Humphrey warned against an extension of judicial interference on
grounds other than jurisdictional or procedural error since "the courts
have no standards to guide them, and can only substitute their own ideas
of what is in the public interest for the ideas of the administrative
authority, a function that would not be judicial but legislative." 124
Wary of increased judicial discretion to interfere with the
administrative process, Humphrey firmly advocated for the creation of a
independent system of administrative review. The existing remedies for
individuals in the administrative process were "hopelessly inadequate"
providing "neither protection for the individual nor a means of ensuring
efficient administration." 125 Humphrey's solution? Like Willis and
Corry, Humphrey argued that "[t]he only possible solution, therefore,
would seem to be the creation of a system of administrative courts in
Ibid. at 635.
Ibid. at 636.
122
Ibid. at 636-637.
123
John P. Humphrey, "Judicial Control over Administrative Action with Special
Reference to the Province of Quebec" ( 1939) 5 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political
Science 41 7 at 417.
124
Ibid. at 427.
125
Ibid. at 429.
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which both the Legislature and the Administration can have
confidence. " 126

J[.....,,l,,.....,,C>

IN THE CANADIAN ADMINISTRATIVE
SCHOLARSHIP

There are several very noticeable trends made clear by the
preceeding synopsis of the scholarly writing on administrative law in the
1930s. The first trend was the vicious attack launched against
nineteenth-century liberalism and its related ideas about the individual
and the laissez-:faire economy. Legal academics, of course, were not the
only Canadians to question these basic assumptions during the
Depression. Many Canadians questioned the traditional way of
understanding the relationship between the citizen and the state. Alvin
Finkel, for example, concludes that some elements of the Canadian
business community supported government economic regulation and
expensive social programs in the hope that these policies would level out
the business cycle. 127 Many of Canada's non-legal intellectuals, and
members of the expanding dominion government bureaucracy also held
these beliefs. 128
ibid. at 430.
Alvin Finkel, Business and Social Reform in the Thirties (Toronto: James Lorimer,
1979). Finkel also discerns frustration amongst business people when courts deemed
government regulatory initiatives unconstitutional, particularly after the New Deal decisions.
Many business people wanted more power given to the dominion government, and would have
agreed with J.F. Davison of the George Washington University School of Law, who wrote in
the Canadian Bar Re)Jfew that "formal arid legalism of the theorists" dictated that the "position
of words and punctuation marks in written briefs has been of greater importance than the
position of industrial units and their combinations for trade and industrial purposes." J.F.
Davison, "The Constitutional Utility of Advisory Opinions" (1937-1938) 2 U.T.L.J. 254 at
274.
Davison was born in Halifax and completed his LLB at Dalhousie. He continued his
academic career at Harvard where he received a LL.Mand S.J.D. by 1929. He promptly began
teaching at George Washington University where he specialized in corporate and
administrative law. Davison wrote about the crisis in formalism in his 1929 article on
jurisprudence. "After years of realism and academic doubt, sociologists, political theorists,
philosophers and jurists are eagerly seeking some formulre which shall contain fundamental
rules for the guidance of contemporary civilisation," suggested Davison, and they "do not seek
the absolutes which the nineteenth century writers sought, but rather something to ensure that
permanence and security which the consolidation of wealth created by the industrial and
126
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scientific development of the last two centuries so urgently demands." J.F. Davison, "The
Study of Jurisprudence" (1929) 7 Can. Bar Rev. 438 at 444. Davison also published an
administrative law case book with American realist scholar Felix Frankfurter in 1932. See
Felix Frankfurter and J. Forrester Davison, Cases and 1Vfaterials on Admti1istrative Lmv
(Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, 1932).
128
For a discussion see Doug Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian
.!t1tellectuals and the Stale, 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986). The
Canadian intellectual class was deeply concerned about the Depression, and the judiciary's
interpretation of the BNA Act. Owram suggests that this group formed in the early 1930s, and
included, among others, McGill economist and lawyer H. Carl Goldenburg; political scientist
and lawyer Norman Rogers of Queen's University; University of Toronto historian Frank
Underhill, and political scientists Harold Innis and V.W. Bladen; and McGill law professors
Brooke Claxton and Frank Scott. These intellectuals believed they should shape government
policy, and thus made inroads into the expanding federal government bureaucracy of the late
1930s. They were also preoccupied with the Canadian constitution, particularly after the
JCPC's New Deal decisions. As the 1930s progressed, the intellectuals deemed constitutional
change a necessary preliminary step to an adequate program of social legislation. They were
instrumental in shaping the 1940 Rowell-Sirois Commission's report on the state of Canadian
federalism which advocated that the dominion government should possess greater taxing
powers, and create National Adjustment Grants to equalize social programs across the
country. Existing historical literature has downplayed the connections between the legal
realists and the 'government generation,' but their mutual concern with the modern
administrative state indicates that the connections between the groups requires further
research.
These non-legal intellectuals produced an immense amount of scholarship on the Canadian
state. Prior to the explosion of discipline-specific journals after World War Two, many of
Canada's most respected publications were non-specific academic journals that published on a
wide-variety of topics. These publications were likely read by many law professors and
lawyers, who were thus exposed to the critiques of the judicial interpretation of the BNA Act
published by intellectuals in the Queens Quarterly, Dalhousie !feJJ!ew, Canadian Joumal i?f
Economics and Political Scknce, and Canadian Forum.
A gauge of the interplay between the 'government generation' and the legal profession was
the publication by non-legal academics in Canadian law journals during the 1930s. In
particular, the Canadkm Bar Review published articles by Norman Rogers and Carl
Goldenburg, both of whom worked as social scientists and possessed legal training. See
Norman McL. Rogers, "The Compact Theory of Confederation" (1931) 9 Can. Bar Rev. 395;
Norman McL. Rogers, "The Dominion and the Provinces" (1933) 11 Can. Bar Rev. 338;
Norman McL. Rogers, "The Introduction of Cabinet Government in Canada" (1933) 11 Can.
Bar Rev. 1; and No1man McL. Rogers, "Federal Influences on the Canadian Cabinet" (1933)
11 Can. Bar Rev. 103; Carl Goldenberg, "Social and Economic Problems in Canadian
Federalism" (1934) 12 Can. Bar Rev. 422 at 425.
In addition, some of Canada's legal professionals explicitly accepted the ideas propounded
by non-legal academics by incorporating the work of these social scientists in many of their
articles. For example, Dalhousie's Vincent MacDonald's discussion of the judicial
interpretation of the constitution drew upon the aiiicles by Goldenburg, Rogers, and O.D.
Skelton published in journals such as the Queen s Qum1erly, the Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political SC1e11ce, and the Froceed!i1gs of !he Canadian Political Science
Association. Vincent C. MacDonald, "Judicial Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution"
(1935-1936) 1 U.T.L.J. 260 at 260, 276, 282, 283, 284.

THE CANADIAN LEGAL REALISTS ... 67

Just as historians have connected the ascent of legal formalism to
nineteenth-century laissez-faire economics and liberal individualism,
the decline of these assumptions was tied to the crisis in Canadian
writing about the administrative state during the 1930s. More advanced
social welfare policies pressured the assumption that the law preserved
individual independence against state interference. This gradual
acceptance of the increased place of the interventionist state was
apparent in the annual reports of the Canadian Bar Association's
committee on statute law. In 1931, the committee reported that
expanding governmental programs would make it difficult "to get
people back to the more fundamental principle of individual
responsibility .... " 129 The committee's view, however, had altered
somewhat by 1939 when it noted that the dominant nineteenth-century
goal was "to secure to the individual the largest possible measure of
personal freedom," but since World War One society sought "social
security and a prosperity in which all shall share." 130
As we have seen, Willis, Kennedy, Corry, Finkelman, Humphrey,
and Hopkins shared an awareness of changing socio-political
assumptions, and a corresponding need for the law to change. Kennedy
perceived this early on, 131 telling the Canadian Bar Association in 1929
that the "individual and his 'rights"' was "giving place to the community
and its needs." 132 The modern state was henceforth to achieve its ends
not by balancing "individuals against one another as legal 'rightbearing' atoms, but as members of groups and associations whose
interests are beneficial." 133 In 1934, Corry argued that formalist rules of
statutory interpretation were inadequate because they were "developed
to interpret statutory changes in the Common Law in an age which was
agreed on the primacy of individual rights." In Depression-era Canada,
129
"Report of the Committee on Notewo1ihy Changes in the State Law" in Aflill!tes <flhe
Proceedri1gs ()(the Slrteenth Anllual Meetli1g ()(the Canadian Bar Association (Toronto:
Carswell, 1932) 138 at 140.
130 "Report of the Committee on Notewo1ihy Changes in Statute Law, 1939" in Afliut!es of
Proceedings ofthe Twm!y-Fourth Annual 1Weetti1g ofthe Canadian Bar Associatioll (Ottawa:
National Printers, 1940) 196 at 199.
131 Risk, "The Many Minds," supra note 3 at 365-367.
132
W.P.M. Kennedy, "Theories of Law and the Constitutional Law of the British Empire"
in M!imles ()(the Proceedli1gs of the Fourteell!h Allllllal Meetli1g of the Calladia11 Bar
Associatioll (Toronto: Carswell, 1930) at 152 at 162.
133 /bid. at 163.
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however, "the great bulk of statutes have to do with the creation or
modification of administrative machinery designed to protect certain
paramount public interests" and thus the "world will not wait while we
misconstrue these provisions by placing them against a background of
the Common Law instead of reading them in light of the social and
economic life with which they deal." 134 Other Canadian realists also
shared these beliefs; for example, in 193 7 a bright young scholar named
Bora Laskin advocated the necessity of taking social factors into
account in legal reasoning:
The accepted complexity of our modern world, the myriad contending
social forces in a continual state of ferment, the constantly changing
social conditions of society, impose a heavy task on courts and
legislatures to keep the law abreast of current trends. Nor are they in a
position to equivocate. The impelling force of economic
circumstances has driven them into hurried activity to seek, from their
cul-de-sac, to avert the possibility of unexampled disorder through the
raproachment of competing social interests, by throwing the weight of
the state behind those interests which the individualistic legal theories
of an evanescent period have proven pitifully inadequate to protect. 135

This alteration in political assumptions made it imperative that the
legal profession change its basic understanding of how the law operated.
Thus, the second broad trend was an almost continual assault on

134
J.A. Corry, Book Review of The Par/iomen/01y Powers o/ English Gover11me11!
Depm1menls, by John Willis (1934) 12 Can. Bar Rev. 60 at 64.
135
B. Laskin, "The Protection of Interests by Statute and the Problems of 'Contracting
Out"' (1937) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 669 at 669-670. Laskin graduated from Kennedy's
undergraduate law program in 1933, then attained his M.A. and LL.B degrees at the
University of Toronto in 1935 and 1936 respectively. Encouraged by Osgoode Hall's Cecil
Wright, Laskin completed an LL.Mat Harvard in 1937. A full-time professor at the University
of Toronto (1940-1945, 1949-1965) and Osgoode Hall (1945-1949), Laskin accepted an
appointment to the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1965, followed by elevation to the Supreme
Court five years later.
For additional acknowledgments that liberal ideals were weakening within the Canadian
legal community see Jules Preudhomme, "Are We Our Brother's Helper" ( 1932-1933) 5 Man.
B.N. 10; Mannie Brown, "Dependants' Relief Acts" (1940) 18 Can. Bar Rev. 261; Mannie
Brown, "An Experiment in Compulsory Co-operation The No!zrral Prodzrcls Aforke1ti1g Act,
1934" (1936) 14 Can. Bar Rev. 71; "Address of Honourable James Grafton Rogers" in
lvftimtes o/Proceedti1gs o/the Eighteenth A1111uo! Jl,feetti1g q/the Co11odion Bor Associat/011
(Toronto: Carswell, 1934) 92; N.W. Rowell, "Presidential Address: Our Heritage in the Civil
Law and the Common Law" in lifimtles o/Proceedti1gs q/t!te Nti1etee11th A mural A-feet1i1g q/
the Co11odkm Bor Associo!to!l (Ottawa: National Printers, 1935) 37 at 47.
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fo1malist thinking. Canadian realists were highly sceptical of conceptual
and abstract thinking in any area of the law. Issues like parliamentary
sovereignty seemed less important in the face of the Depression than did
the creation of (to use Willis' favourite phrase) a functional approach to
administrative law. Practicalities, not theory, were the most important
considerations. The Canadian scholars were similar to their English
academic cousins in this regard, who, according to Martin Loughlin,
employed an empirical and historical approach to administrative law,
argued for framework legislation and delegated legislation as essential
to efficient administrative allocation of administrative tasks, and
advocated for the creation of tribunals and boards in which the people
with the best technical knowledge and expertise would determine
outcomes. 136
The third trend showed that, while the Canadian legal realists were
highly adept at critiquing judicial and professional attitudes towards
administrative law, they generally failed to provide an adequate
framework for future administrative schemes. This may have resulted
from the size of the foe these academics challenged. Immense amounts
of their efforts were spent identifying the change in socio-political
assumptions and the need for law to meet these new demands.
Relatively little time was devoted to discussing, for example, when
courts should consider reviewing administrative decisions. Most of
these academics failed to give much attention to the question of what
procedures administrative tribunals should employ beyond broad
principles of natural justice. As we have seen, these scholars were
talented at advocating for a faith in expertise, rejecting the attitudes of
courts, and defending administrative discretion, but were less sure what
the new administrative state might look like upon completion. The
differing attitudes about the establishment of an independent
administrative appeal comi exemplified this failure to reach consensus
on the structure of the regulatory process. As we have seen, Corry,
Willis, and Humphrey proposed a system of administrative courts;
Finkelman, Kennedy, and Hopkins, on the other hand, looked to the
common law courts to review administrative errors.
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VI. A

SPREADING ACCEPTANCE OF ADMINISTATIVE LAw?

Existing literature on legal attitudes towards the administrative
state during the 1930s emphasizes the polarity of positions between the
academic realists and Canada's practitioners. 137 Many lawyers and
judges clearly had concerns about the growth of the administrative state
during this period, but a survey of Canada's regional and practicefocused law journals hints that the realists may have begun a shift in the
debate about administrative law by the end of the 1930s. 138 The
conservative Fortnightly Law Journal remained unconvinced, leading
attacks on administrative tribunals throughout the l 930s. 139 The
Saskatchewan Bar Review was similarly unswayed. 140 The contents of
137

See e.g. Risk, "Lawyers," supra note 4 at 41; and J. Willis, "Canadian Administrative
Law in Retrospect" (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 225 at 228.
138
An analysis of the effect of the Canadian legal realists on the broader legal profession is
of course very difficult. The following analysis of the contents of Canada's less academicallyoriented law journals is offered as only one potential starting point for future research on these
trends. These journals are also employed out of a belief that they have been underutilised by
Canadian legal historians studying the shift in lawyers' attitudes about the law.
The shift argued for here was likely assisted by the establishment of courses on
administrative law at some Canadian law schools. The University of Toronto instituted such a
course in the early 1930s, and Dalhousie in 1937. Willis, ibid. at 230.
139
Robert Michael Willes Chitty edited the Fortmghtly Law Joumal from the journal's
inception in 1931. Under Chitty's direction, the Fortnightly Law Journal was the voice of
Canadian legal conservatism. Chitty, for example, was well-known for his resistance to the
modernization oflegal education in Ontario. Kyer and Bickenbach, supra note 34 at 139. State
action, the Fortmght!y Law Joumal typically argued, undermined individual rights. It often
made analogies between the expansion in Canadian government regulation and the fascist
activity in Japan and Europe. In 1937, for instance, the Fortmghtly Law Journal
complimented the courts on turning back increased government regulation, and theorized that
"the ingenuity of the politician is being taxed to devise new means of attack in this warfare in
the which the aggressor is as obvious as in the Sino-Japanese conflict." "Another Battle in the
Legislature's War on the Courts" (1937) 7 Fortnightly Law Journal 114 at 114. Similarly, in
1939 it asserted that "the war the Courts are fighting is a war against would-be Hitlerism in our
government." "Legislative Fight to Dominate the Courts" (1939) 9 Fortnightly Law Journal
65 at 65. Also see, for example, "Government by Regulation" (1934) 4 Fortnightly Law
Journal 129; W. McKeah, "The Evils of Legislation by Regulation" (1934) 4 Fortnightly Law
Journal 136; "War on Bureaucracy" (1937) 7 Fortnightly Law Journal 82; "Constitutional
Limitations Upon the Growth of Administrative Tribunals" (1938) 7 Fortnightly Law Journal
297; "The Road to Dictatorship" (1938) 8 Fortnightly Law Journal 113.
140
See, e.g., F.W. Turnball, "Are Coutts and Judges to be Discarded?" (1938) 3 Sask. Bar
Rev. 68; and "Views of the Profession" (1937) 2 Sask. Bar Rev. 23 in which several
Saskatchewan lawyers expressed their concern with the Depression-era expansion of boards
and tribunals.
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the Manitoba Bar News and the Bench and Bar, however, indicate a
limited increase in the acceptance of administrative tribunals. For
example, while a number of aiiicles in the Manitoba Bar News141
expressed concern about the rise of administrative tribunals in the
1930s, 142 the decade ended with a response to these attacks. In an article
entitled "In Defence of Administrative Tribunals," Leslie Orr Rowland
argued that "the law administered by our present judicial system has
reached its limit of improvement or development. The formality of
procedure, the intricacies of pleadings, the observance of precedent,
have all contributed to stopping the natural development of the
communal law." 143
Articles in the Bench and Bar displayed a similar trend during the
1930s. 144 Less formalist perspectives appeared by 1934. The Bench and
Bar editorialized that in "a country the size of Canada it is inevitable that
certain functions of government must be delegated to special bodies." 145
The Bench and Bar also reported on a speech by Dean James Grafton
Rogers of the University of Colorado Law School. Rogers contended
that lawyers would
accept and understand the machine1y of administrative law, will aid in
devising machinery to remedy its present clumsy operation, and we
may even see a separate or parallel system of administrative tribunals
set up, instead of trying to call on judges trained in common law
methods to adapt themselves to a system so alien in spirit and
method. 146
141

The 1Vlcmitoba Bar News started in 1928 under the editorialship of J. Ragnar Johnson, a
graduate of the Manitoba Law School and the LL.M program at Harvard. Dale Gibson and Lee
Gibson, Sl!bstantial Justice: Law and Lawyers in Manitoba, !670-1970 (Winnipeg: Peguis
Publishers, 1972) at 251.
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See, e.g., "The New Despotism" (1929-1930) 2 Man. B.N. 4; F.E. Simpson, "Whither
Canada? Rule of Law or Bureaucracy (1934-1935) 7 Man. B.N. 6; "Editorial" (1936-1937)
9 Man. B.N. 344; Administrative Tribunals in Manitoba" (1937-1938) 10 Man. B.N. 569;
C.V. McArthur, "Signs of the Times" (1939-1940) 12 Man. B.N. 65.
143
Leslie Orr Rowland, "In Defence of Administrative Tribunals" (1939-1940) 12 Man.
B.N. 122 at 123. See also R.B. Graham, "Signs of The Times" (1939-1940) 12 Man. B.N. 85.
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The Bench and Bar was a national legal newspaper under the editorialship of Harold
Rose that started publication in I 931 and reported notable legal events. For conservative
comments on the growth of administrative tribunals see "Commissions and Courts" (March
1933) 3 Bench and Bar 2; and "Legal Frankenstein?" (July 1933) 3 Bench and Bar 2.
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"Sixty-Seven Years of Confederation" (July 1934) 4 Bench and Bar 2 at 2.
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"A New Legal Profession" (July 1935) 5 Bench and Bar 12 at 12. See also the comments
of John Willis in "The Profession Speaks" (July 1935) 5 Bench and Bar 2.
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While these assertions were still few in number during the late 1930s,
their inclusion in the Manitoba Bar News and Bench and Bar hints at a
slow change in attitudes.

VII CONCLUSION
By 1941 the Canadian realists had written an impressive collection
of scholarly legal work on the Canadian administrative state. These
authors helped undermine traditional ways of thinking about the
administrative state, and, more importantly, about the basic functioning
of the law. Frank Scott criticized this literature in 1948, suggesting that
Canadian administrative law writing "except when dealing with special
aspects of Canadian federalism, has been largely derivative, having
followed closely the lead of English and American scholars and
publicists." 147 In retrospect, Scott's analysis seems overly harsh. The
Canadian legal realists identified that the Depression was a time of
change - a terrifying time, but also a time of experimentation in public
law. That Willis, Finkelman, Corry, Kennedy, Humphrey, and Hopkins
could not fully construct a new system of administrative law attuned to
Canadian needs in a single decade should not de-value their efforts at
undermining formalist approaches to the law. There was still much to be
thought through after the publication of the works described in this
paper. The realists, however, had slain many of the fears about the
growing administrative state. In the years ahead, courts and academics
would wrestle with the appropriate standard of review to be applied to
the decisions of tribunals and boards. The critics of the 1930s, however,
had accomplished their goal: by convincing Canadian lawyers that
discretion existed in administrative and judicial processes, and that
policy implications were inherent in any decision, these academics
opened the door for future debate and scholarship in administrative law.
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